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There is a wide gap between two branches of sociological investiga- 
tions. Social theory, on the one hand, has ever since its origin been 
directed towards the study of the social system as a whole. Empirical 
research in sociology, on the other hand, has largely focused upon 
individual behaviour and the consequences of certain changes at the 
system level on this behaviour. According to Coleman, this is due to 
the fact that observations are usually made at the level of individuals. 
This state of affairs is unsatisfactory for theoretical s well as practical 
reasons. Focusing on the practical reasons, and admitting that 
sociological knowledge should be useful to guide policy interventions, 
we have to face two facts. First, policy makers are mainly interested in
the consequences of a certain policy measure on the social system as a 
whole. Second, most policy measures are effective at the individual 
level and policy makers attempt o influence individual behaviour in 
such a way that the desired consequences at the system level are 
achieved. From this perspective both theoretical and empirical re- 
search in sociology are defunct. Traditional social theory is not useful 
to guide policy interventions, because it tends to neglect he fact that 
individuals mediate between policy measures and system-wide con- 
sequences of those policy measures. Empirical research that focuses on 
individual behaviour is not useful, because the system-wide con- 
sequences of the interactions between individuals are not studied. 
What is needed is a type of social research in which the system wide 
consequences of changes in the social system are studied with in- 
dividual behaviour performing the role of mediator: the gap between 
social theory and empirical research in sociology has to be closed. 
The closing of this gap is the main target of James Coleman's 
Theory and Decision 34: 73-81, 1993. 
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The closing of this gap is the main target of James Coleman's 
Foundations of Social Theory. This magnum opus really is a significant 
book in many respects. It delves into the philosophical foundations of 
sociology, it discusses relations between sociology and other social 
sciences, it treats theoretical and empirical issues, it gives a formal and 
nonformal analysis of many ideas, and moreover, it contains quite a 
few nice examples in which the general theme of the book is 
illustrated. The present review can only deal with a very limited 
number of these points. In the following I will concentrate on three 
important elements of the book. First, I will discuss the version of 
methodological individualism (MI) that Coleman endorses. Second, I
will go into the method Coleman regards as the most appropriate from 
the perspective of MI, namely the economic method of general 
equilibrium analysis. Finally, I will spend some time on the issue of 
normative versus positive theory. Along the way I will introduce the 
reader to some of the examples Coleman uses. At points I will make 
some critical remarks on the content of the book. This should not be 
regarded as a way to belittle what Coleman has accomplished, but 
rather as a warning that there is still a long way to go before the gap is 
closed. 
1. METHODOLOGICAL  INDIV IDUAL ISM 
From the above introduction it will be clear that Coleman tries to build 
a bridge between social theory and social research that can be useful 
for policy interventions. It is also clear that this bridge should allow for 
two transitions, namely one (the macro-to-micro t ansition) from the 
system level to the level of individual behaviour and the other (the 
micro-to-macro transition) from the level of individual behaviour back 
to the system level, As an example of how the two transitions can be 
conceptualized, consider Max Weber's tudy on the relation between a
protestant religious doctrine and the origin of capitalism. Coleman 
(pp. 6-10) analyses this example by means of Figure 1. The figure 
shows that the direct relation between the system-wide phenomena 
'Calvinism' and 'capitalism' is an emergent one. It 'really' is a 
consequence of the relations indicated by arrows 1, 2 and 3. Arrow 1 
depicts the macro-to-micro transition: protestant religion generates 
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Fig. 1. 
certain values in individuals who adhere to the religion. Arrow 2 says 
that individuals with certain values are more likely to show a particular 
kind of economic behaviour. Arrow 3 depicts the micro-to-macro 
transition: the interaction of individuals who behave in a certain 
economic way helps to bring about a capitalistic organization form in 
society. The micro-to-macro transition then is the main problem in 
many of the social sciences (see also the critique of empirical research 
in sociology above). It is, Coleman argues, also the main weakness of 
Weber's account of the rise of capitalism. 
To illustrate the claim that the micro-to-macro transition really is a 
main problem in social science and to come back to the major 
deficiency of much empirical research that is done, consider the policy 
measure of providing job training for black youth in order to decrease 
unemployment (see Coleman, pp. 642-645 and the references given 
there). Empirical research as shown that there is some evidence for 
the statement that enrollment in job training programs increases the 
individual's probability of being employed. Clearly, unemployment i  
society will decrease only if a new job is created or a vacant job filled. 
It will not decrease if the trained individual replaces omeone lse. 
However, there is hardly any research showing whether or not 
somebody is replaced and, thus, the research that has been done does 
not give guidance for policy intervention. 
The above two examples also show what form of MI Coleman has in 
mind. It is a form in which individual behaviour is affected by the 
social environment in which the individual is situated, and it is also a 
form that allows relationships atthe system level to be quite dissimilar 
from relationships at the individual evel. It is also not denied that 
correlations exist at the system level, but what is denied is that an 
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explanation of such a correlation can be given without reference to 
individual behaviour. This is a very weak form of MI (especially when 
taking into account the fact that Coleman has a broad view of the 
notion of an individual; see below) and it is mainly argued for on the 
grounds that, in sociology, data on individual behaviour are more 
readily available and that the relationships that prove to be consistent 
with MI are more stable ('autonomous') against policy interventions 
than relations at the system level. Another reason Coleman mentions 
for requiting that a theory be consistent with MI is that in such a 
theory the fundamental problems of moral and political philosophy 
concerning the relation between man and society can be raised. This 
cannot be said for much of what goes under the name of social theory. 
Before discussing the method Coleman actually uses, two elements of 
Coleman's version of MI should be emphasized. First, we have not yet 
specified who can be considered as 'individuals' in the social system 
and, second, we have yet not said what theory of individual behaviour 
is considered. 
With respect to the question of who can be considered as 'in- 
dividuals' in a theory about social systems Coleman takes a pragmatic 
attitude. He introduces the notion of an 'actor', which he regards as a 
human body or some kind of organization or institution that has 
interests, resources and the right to control these resources. This 
definition means that what can be regarded as an actor is closely 
related to what type of agents are distinguished by the law, because 
property rights determine which property belongs to whom and also 
who has the right to decide how this property will be used. Note, then, 
that the law in many modern societies regards, for example, firms and 
(local) governments as actors. Also, if we are interested in the 
consequences of certain system-wide policy interventions it is often 
useful to regard firms and governments as the basic units of analysis 
because it is on these units that the policy is supposed to have an 
effect. (In fact, Coleman devotes a large part of his book (pp. 
531-650) to Modern Society in which he argues that the notion of a 
'corporate actor' is what distinguishes modem society from more 
traditional societies.) Finally, observe that the notions of 'individual' 
and 'system' are relative to each other: If we consider a firm as the 
system in a particular study, then we cannot take the firm to be the 
individual in that system as well. 
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The theory of individual behaviour that is invoked is that of a 
purposeful actor and often a simple utility maximization under con- 
straints is used. Now, Coleman immediately admits that certain actions 
are better described in other ways (p. 15). Nevertheless, he sticks to it 
and again, largely for pragmatic reasons. One reason is to be able to fit 
sociological discourse better into the discourse of other political and 
social sciences in which t e model of purposive action is frequently 
used. A reason to use maximization of utility is its simplicity, which is 
highly desirable due to the complexities that are most likely to arise in 
the macro-to-micro and the micro-to-macro transitions. A 'deeper' 
argument is that many social theorists construct their theories with a 
purpose in mind. An inconsistency arises if these theories themselves 
are based on non-purposive actors, because the purposeful social 
theorist himself is part of the social system in which he is an actor. Of 
course, this argument depends on the assumption that the theorist is 
right in believing that he constructs theories purposefully. 
2. GENERAL EQUIL IBR IUM ANALYS IS  
So far, we have sketched the general approach in which Coleman's 
work has to be considered. I largely agree with this approach and think 
that it is powerful enough to yield quite a few interesting insights. 
When it comes to the method Coleman regards as the most appropri- 
ate method that is in line with MI and in which issues uch as the ones 
considered above can be studied, he chooses the economic method of 
perfectly competitive general equilibrium analysis. The last part of the 
book (pp. 667-932), in which nonformal arguments are formalized by 
means of mathematics i , in fact, largely based on this competitive 
model. 
In the general equilibrium model agents have endowments and 
preferences over consumption bundles. They exchange commodities in
order to achieve a higher utility level. In equilibrium, prices (emergent 
phenomena) are identical for each pairwise exchange. Equilibria are 
Pareto efficient. Coleman interprets the endowments a resources and 
the value of those resources as the power of an individual actor. He 
works exclusively with Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the param- 
eters of these functions are interpreted as the interest of a particular 
actor in that particular commodity. Accordingly, he has given an 
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interpretation to the concept of an actor in this particular model. To 
the present reviewer the restriction to the Cobb-Douglas case seems 
to be unduly restrictive. It is well known for its simplicity, but also for 
its specificity. In particular, there are no cross-effects from one market 
to the other. It remains to be seen whether or not the results Coleman 
derives depend crucially on this specification. 
With this competitive model he analyzes uch issues as trust, power 
and norms (pp. 747-829). Let us take trust as an example to illustrate 
the type of exchange Coleman is concerned with. An actor, the 
trustor, who places trust in another actor, the trustee, gives up 
something with certainty in order to receive something he prefers, but 
with a risk that he won't get it. The trustor will only engage in the 
exchange if his expected gain is higher than the loss with certainty. The 
trustee, on the other hand, will prove to be trustworthy if the negative 
impact of proving not to be trustworthy (due to reputation effects 
which may harm him in the future) outweighs the immediate gain. 
Coleman introduces a probability, p, that the trust will be justified in 
the competitive model and show that the resulting equilibrium is more 
efficient he higher p is. 
The validity of general equilibrium analysis depends crucially on a 
belief in the functioning of the market system. Many of the issues 
Coleman considers are discussed in terms of (social) exchange. For 
example, in discussing the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (pp. 204-205, 
and 253) Coleman argues that the cooperative outcome can easily be 
sustained by rational behaviour (i.e., without a norm) by setting up a 
'market' in which rights to control actions are xchanged. Obviously, 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma everyone has an interest in controlling the 
other's actions and ff everyone has the right to control someone lse's 
action, then the cooperative outcome will result as a consequence of
rational behaviour on the part of the actors. Of course, in a small 
community in which people can easily communicate with each other 
and in which it is legally allowed to exchange rights to determine 
someone lse's action, Coleman's uggestion seems to be very smart. 
There is, of course, a question here whether his solution should be 
regarded as part of a positive or normative theory of social interaction. 
This issue will be dealt with in the next section. The issue that should 
concern us here is whether Coleman's uggestion can also be effective 
when a society as a whole faces a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. 
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The general equilibrium model is meant to represent a world in 
which every individual actor is small relative to the society as a whole. 
In such a world it is very likely that the individual actor does not have 
an incentive to set up a market for exchange. A complete system of 
markets has to exist beforehand. The main difficulty of general 
equilibrium theory, then, is that if everyone takes the xchange rates 
as given, then from an individualistic point of view it is not clear how 
exchange rates come about. Economics textbooks allude to an auction- 
eer (or central clearing house) who determines prices, but in real 
markets- in which no auctioneer exists- the introduction f an auc- 
tioneer seems to be just an illegitimate short-cut for saying that the 
system as a whole determines prices. Another way to 'solve' this 
problem is to introduce a law of demand and supply, but the 
individualistic foundations for this law are largely unexplored. Thus, 
from the point of view of MI there are severe problems with the way 
the general equilibrium model accounts for exchange rates. In order to 
do justice to Coleman I should note that he himself mentions ome of 
the above problems when he notices that it is unlikely that there is a 
double coincidence of wants and when he observes that "in much of 
the economic literature on the perfectly competitive market, the 
institutional and social-structural ssumptions remain implicit" (p. 
686). The modifications to he model of perfect competition that he 
promises to give (p. 687) do not deal in a fully adequate way with the 
abovementioned issues, however. 
What this critique all amounts to is that I do not see very good 
reasons why Coleman has taken the perfectly competitive model as his 
point of reference. In my view it is more natural to take noncoopera- 
tive game theory as a point of reference, especially given the view of 
MI outlined above. On pp. 11-12 Coleman himself sketches the 
components of such a game-theoretic approach and he discusses how 
the macro-to-micro and the micro-to-macro transitions find a natural 
place in such an approach. In noncooperative game theory one has to 
specify the roles of the players and their goals (interests). Further- 
more, one has to specify what actions each player is allowed to take. 
Finally, rules have to be specified which state the consequences of each 
player's action for other players in the game. The rules of the game 
taken together specify the macro-to-micro transition, because the 
action the individual actor takes depends on the (social) rules of the 
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game. The micro-to-macro transition is mirrored in the way the actions 
combine with each other. The noncooperative game theoretic ap- 
proach is thus very much in line with MI and its main advantage 
(relative to the general equilibrium model) is that there is no need to 
introduce a dubious concept asthe auctioneer for the micro-to-macro 
transition to be accomplished. 
3. NORMATIVE  OR POSIT IVE  THEORY 
Above, we have encountered the issue whether Coleman's suggestion 
to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma is a normative or a positive one. In 
this last section I will delve further into this issue. 
It is well known that positive and normative interpretations of the 
notion of rational behaviour coexist. It is not my intention here to take 
a position on this issue, but instead I will stress the relevance of this 
discussion for Coleman's enterprise. At some points it is not clear 
whether Foundations ofSocial Theory gives foundations for positive or 
normative theory. Besides the discussion on the Prisoner's Dilemma 
mentioned above, positive and normative considerations intermingle 
when Coleman discusses ocial choice theory and the relation between 
social theory and political philosophy. 
When dealing with social choice theory (pp. 371-421) Coleman 
mentions that, from a methodological individualistic point of view, it is 
not surprising that the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
does not hold when social choice is based on majority voting. The 
example he gives is about the election of a candidate in the Democratic 
mayoral primary in Chicago in 1983 (pp. 400-402). First, there were 
two candidates- a black and a white- and in the polls the white 
candidate came out ahead. When a second white candidate ntered the 
race, the black candidate won the elections. This phenomenon can 
easily be explained by the fact that voting was largely along racial 
lines. The axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives does not 
have to be violated at the individual evel. Coleman goes on to study 
the characteristics of different voting procedures (as Borda elimination 
and Condorcet's procedure). So far, this analysis can be regarded as 
part of a positive theory of how choices are made in societies which are 
governed by different voting procedures. But then, in summarizing the 
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results, he observes that having gone through several steps one is lead 
in the direction of a good procedure (p. 413) so that a normative 
element has slipped into the discussion. 
The second case in which the distinction between normative and 
positive theory is not very sharp is when discussing the relation 
between social theory and political philosophy. On p. 41 Coleman is 
quite explicit about the normative aspirations of his theory. He 
considers the general equilibrium model and concludes that in this 
model attributing utility functions to individual agents made it possible 
to base normative statements on this model (cf. Rawls and Nozick, 
among others). Following a standard argument in welfare economics, 
one of the reasons for using utility maximization in social theory is to 
have the potential to make such normative statements based on the 
theory. On pp. 344-345, on the other hand, Coleman notes that the 
devices (such as the veil of ignorance) used by political philosophers 
have a major drawback when it comes to positive social theory, namely 
that they are based on patently false assumptions. It is, for example, 
not true that each person is totally ignorant about his future possibi- 
lities. Moving to positive social theory, then, entails- according to 
Coleman- removing this false assumption from the theory. Due to 
space limitations I can only note that this position presupposes that the 
difference between positive and normative theory relates to the issue 
of the descriptive adequacy of the assumptions and that the other 
assumptions made, notably the assumption that individuals behave 
rationally, are descriptively adequate. Both presuppositions seem to be 
debatable. 
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